History and methodological challenges
Throughout the 1990s, the PPI for the airline industry was based on a pricing method according to which an individual fare code offered by a sampled airline was selected for a specific origin and destination (O&D). The starting and ending point of a flight, the O&D is variously referred to as a route, city pair, or market. Each fare code specifies the following characteristics:
·
The class in which the passenger will travel (e.g., first class, coach) · Advance purchase information (e.g., 7 days in advance of the flight, 14 days, the same day as the flight) One advantage of pricing a single fare code was that it ensured consistency with the "fixed input output price index" (FIOPI) assumptions that form the basis of the program's index methodology. 4 In addition, the terms of transaction for each sale were held constant in all pricing periods.
However, airline industry trends that occurred throughout the 1990s and 2000s revealed key weaknesses with the fare code method. As airline computer systems became more advanced, the airlines began issuing a larger variety of fare codes so that they could more easily react to changes in demand. At the same time, the airline industry shifted away from traditional distribution channels, such as call centers and brick-and-mortar travel agencies, and toward Internet-based distribution channels. The shift toward Internet-based distribution channels was expedited as the airlines began to charge customers small fees for speaking with call center representatives and as they stopped paying commissions to traditional travel agencies, causing many of them to go out of business. 5 Web-based airline ticket distributors, such as Expedia and Travelocity, earned increasing revenues and market share during that time. Airlines responded by selling tickets directly to consumers via the Internet in order to compete with these online travel agencies.
At the same time, consumers felt that they could make informed decisions and realize greater savings by using both online travel agents and the airlines' websites to do comparison shopping. Internet bookings from those two sources grew from 7 percent of all bookings in 1999 to 30 percent by 2002. 6 As airlines began selling more tickets directly online to passengers, they introduced an increasing number of new fare codes, including
Internet-only fares and deep discount email sales. As these and more fare codes were introduced, it became increasingly difficult to represent industry prices with existing PPI item allocations. Requesting additional items was considered, but respondent burden was a concern, with BLS unwilling to jeopardize continued cooperation with the survey.
At the time, the PPI airline index did not encompass these Internet fare codes. As a result, in early 2003 BLS analysts conducted research to gauge the feasibility of augmenting pricing data to include deeply discounted web-based fares. The research indicated that it would not be possible to use the fare code method to maintain constant-quality fare codes to be tracked over time, because many web-based fare codes were introduced with deep discounts and then quickly discontinued. This strategy on the part of the airlines created a twofold problem: deeply discounted fare codes with special restrictions were almost impossible to select for pricing, and even if these fare codes were selected for pricing, they would be discontinued so quickly that they could not be priced consistently from month to month. For example, some airlines introduce holiday fire sales on the Fourth of July and then remove these fare codes as soon as the holiday ends.
Another shortcoming of the fare code method is that frequent-flyer mile awards, referred to as zero fares in the industry, were excluded from the PPI because they do not generate revenue. Worse, the problem was exacerbated by rapidly rising numbers of frequent-flyer miles granted through avenues other than air travel, such as credit card spending, hotel stays, rental car bookings, and shopping at preferred vendors. 7 The total number of frequent-flyer awards redeemed grew 61.7 percent from 1997 to 2005. 8 With the fare code method, this increased granting of frequent-flyer awards was not directly shown as a price decrease in the data for the index.
As airlines changed or removed fare codes that the PPI tracked, the typical procedure was to substitute another fare code with similar characteristics. Base fare codes were frequently taken as substitutes, because they were usually offered each month. These codes, however, did not reflect periodic fare sales and were not always regularly used. As more and more fare codes were replaced over time, the PPI airline index ended up with a large number of base fare codes that tended to increase in a slow and steady manner, irrespective of market conditions.
As figure 2 illustrates, the limitations of the fare code method caused the PPI passenger airline index to fail to capture price declines that were reflected in the A4A Monthly Passenger Yield Index 9 in the period from January 2000 to June 2004. During this period, the PPI airline index grew almost 20 percent while the A4A index declined more than 10 percent.
5
One method that BLS employed to deal with these issues was the introduction of a variation of the fare code method: the "fare code bucket" strategy, which was used from 2000 until 2004. With this approach, a group of fare codes with similar restrictions was presented to respondents on each survey form. When the originally selected fare code was either discontinued or not used in a given period, the respondent was instructed to provide instead the price for a ticket represented by one of the fare codes with similar restrictions. The price for the latter ticket was then directly compared with the price for the ticket covered by the originally selected fare code. The fare code bucket strategy allowed the index to capture some airline price changes that were executed by moving ticket inventory across similar fare codes, but the improvement was only transitory, because it still failed to capture deeply discounted temporary fare sales and zero fares.
Introduction of the new method
To better reflect the increased use of the Internet and discounted and zero fares, BLS analysts developed a new method that uses average prices, calculated by dividing total passenger revenue (excluding taxes and government fees) earned from the sale of all tickets on all of the sampled airline's flights on a selected O&D by the total number of passengers who traveled on those flights. This price is referred to as the average revenue per passenger, or ARPP, and the associated method is called the ARPP method.
An important consideration in establishing the ARPP method was how to define the period to be covered by the transactions involved. Ideally, ARPP data would cover an entire month so that any and all travel-related events that occur in a given month (such as holidays) would be included. However, this approach presented a problem because participating airlines needed a number of days after the end of the month to retrieve and report the data. The problem arises because the BLS requires a closeout date for price submission so that indexes can be calculated and analyzed prior to public dissemination, and this closeout date occurs close to the end of the month, too early for the airlines to provide data on all travel days in the month. As a result, full monthly ARPP data could be reported only with a 1-month lag. Using an ARPP that covers the first 21 calendar days of the current month was selected as an alternative. This strategy allowed ample time (about 7 business days, on average) for a participating airline to retrieve and submit its data for inclusion in the current month's index. Also, three occurrences of each day of the week would be used to calculate the data. This stipulation is important because airline fares typically fluctuate with the day of the week of travel and the averages would, therefore, not be comparable if varying numbers of weekday or weekend flights were included from month to month. Finally, using a 21-day period served to produce a more accurate index than would be produced with a 7-or 14-day period, because, with the former, more flights are represented.
To maintain consistency with the FIOPI principle, the O&D and class of service are held constant in all ARPP transactions collected. Once the O&D is selected, it is classified as domestic or international.
Using the ARPP pricing method allows the PPI to capture price trends from all ticketed transactions, regardless of how or by what means the tickets are distributed. The ARPP methodology was implemented on a flow basis. As each airline that was sampled agreed to ARPP pricing, the new data were incorporated into the index and that airline's fare-code-based pricing was discontinued. The process began in early 2004 and was completed by the end of that year.
Treatment of ancillary fees
As the airline industry lost more than $50 billion between 2001 and 2011, 10 firms began to focus increasingly on alternative revenue management strategies. One important way that airlines generated additional revenue was through new or increased ancillary fees. Although some ancillary fees had existed for years, many airlines started charging new fees for services that traditionally were part of the service that passengers expected when purchasing an airline ticket. Among the new fees were fees for first and second checked bags, cancellations of tickets, seat selection, blankets and pillows, carry-on bags, reservations made over the phone or in person (as opposed to those made over the Internet), and in-flight food and beverages. Revenue attributable to most of these fees is a small part of overall revenue, with the exception of baggage and cancellation charges, which are the most common and the largest of the new fees in terms of revenue. Revenue from these two sources, which have become increasingly important contributors to airlines' bottom lines, grew from $1.4 billion in 2007 to $5.7 billion in 2010. 11 Figure 4 shows the growth in revenue generated by baggage and cancellation fees over the last two decades. 8 Because system limitations prevent most airlines from accounting for ancillary fees on an O&D basis, such fees are not included in the average-revenue-per-passenger data collected for the PPI. BLS attempted to obtain data on baggage and cancellation fees directly from sampled airlines, but the airlines were unable to report the information in a timely manner. As a result, BLS instead utilizes fee data published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). With these data, BLS developed a procedure to capture the percent change caused by the implementation of first and second checked bag fees by U.S. airlines. First, average bag fees per passenger are calculated for each sampled airline by dividing total passenger baggage fee revenue by total passengers. Then, the average bag fees per passenger are added to the average revenue per passenger, for each O&D that the PPI collects directly from the airlines, yielding the adjusted average revenue per passenger.
This adjusted average revenue per passenger is used in the PPI airline index, with the adjustment calculated separately on a quarterly basis for domestic and international O&Ds. The procedure allows the PPI to incorporate the baggage fees within the 5-month period after initial publication of the index, a period in which PPI data remain subject to revision. 12 The initial baggage fee adjustment was first reflected in the PPI airline index in March 2009 in a manner that isolated the change due to the imposition of first and second checked bag fees. Baggage fees continues to be adjusted each quarter, and a similar procedure was instituted for cancellation fees, with data reflecting this adjustment introduced in May 2009.
Price trends for the two indexes
Although the PPI for scheduled passenger air transportation and the A4A Monthly Passenger Yield Index are similar, there are some important differences between them. The main difference involves the FIOPI concept, to which the PPI must adhere whereas the A4A index does not. In order to stay consistent with FIOPI, the PPI holds trip length constant by collecting average prices for specified O&Ds. By contrast, the A4A index does not hold trip length constant, instead using systemwide data. As a result, when airlines add or drop routes, A4A data may be affected whereas the PPI (under a methodology that is consistent with its use as a price deflator) would not. The A4A index divides total revenue by revenue passenger miles flown, while the PPI uses only the number of passengers in the denominator. Also, the PPI includes baggage and cancellation fee data that are excluded from the A4A index. Table 1 compares and contrasts the PPI and the A4A index. Quantitative analysis.
PPI A4A
Average revenue per passenger, plus adjustments for bag and cancellation fees * excludes government taxes and fees
Yield: the average fare paid by customers to fly 1 mile * excludes government taxes and fees * excludes baggage and cancellation fees AS THE COMPLEXITY AND VARIATION of airfare pricing increased in recent decades, BLS responded by modifying the methodology used to track prices from an individual fare code approach to an average-pricing approach. The latter methodology allows the PPI to monitor prices for all passenger ticket sales for a given O&D and seat class. This approach greatly increases the number of transactions that are included in the PPI sample.
It also allows the index to reflect price changes caused by the addition of new fare codes, the shifting of 
